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I.— ALLEGED SELF-CONTRADICTIONS IN THE 
CONCEPT OF RELATION — A CRITICISM OF 
MR. BRADLEY'S "APPEARANCE AND REALITY," 
PT. I, CH. III. 
By G. F. STOUT. 
IN Part I of his work on Appearance and Reality, Mr. Bradley 
attempts to convict all the fundamental concepts of ordinary 
and scientific experience of internal incoherence and con-
sequent falsity. On first reading the book I thought that 
he had proved his case. Indeed, my own previous reflection 
had prepared me to accept his argument. But I have for 
long felt misgivings on the subject. My condition for some 
time was like that of one who gazes at a figure drawn in 
ambiguous perspective. At one moment he perceives lines 
and angles as projecting, and at another as receding. So to 
me Mr. Bradley's dialectic sometimes seemed to be conclusive 
and sometimes the reverse. However, at present my view is 
steady, and I appear to see that the alleged self-contradictions 
do not exist. This being so, I feel that it may be of some use 
to myself, perhaps to others, to raise a discussion on the point. 
And there is only one way of doing so to any purpose. It is 
futile to talk mere generalities in criticising such a work as 
Appearance and Reality. You. must face the details of the 
argument or you do nothing. And certainly this task might 
intimidate the boldest. For in close knit dialectical reasoning, 
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2 G. F. STOUT. 
Mr. Bradley has had no superior from the time of Zeno down-
wards. Still the thing has got to be done if we are to make 
any advance. Therefore, since no one else seems to come 
forward, I make this attempt myself on the chance that my 
cause may turn out to be a good one, and may compensate 
my personal deficiencies. 
But to deal with the whole argument of Part I in a single 
paper is plainly impossible. I therefore select for the present 
occasion the chapter on " Relation and Quality." I select 
it on the ground that Mr. Bradley himself ascribes to it 
fundamental importance. " The reader," he says, " who has 
followed and has grasped the principle of this chapter will 
have little need to spend his time on those that succeed it. 
He will have seen that our experience where relational is not 
true; and he will have condemned almost without a hearing 
the great mass of phenomena." 
1. Relation and Continuity.—Before dealing with the points 
in which Mr. Bradley's treatment of relation fails to satisfy 
me, I shall first dwell on a point in which I entirely agree 
with him. I agree with him that no relation or system of 
relations can ever constitute a self-subsistent and self-contained 
reality. The all-inclusive universe cannot ultimately consist 
in a collection of interrelated terms. So far I find myself in 
accord with Mr. Bradley. But my reason is not found among 
the arguments which he advances. My reason is that all 
relations hold between the partial features or aspects of some 
whole, and that ultimately the whole, within which they fall, 
has a form of unity which is not, and cannot be, constituted 
merely by relations. I t cannot be so constituted because it-
is a continuum, and continuous connection, as such, is not 
relation in the sense in which Mr. Bradley uses the word.* 
* If any one choose to call it a relation, he may. All I desire is that 
he should admit it to be a peculiar sort of relation. And its peculiarity 
lies in the fact that it is immediate, and therefore does not presuppose 
intervening links between the terms related. 
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SELF-CONTRADICTIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF RELATION. 3 
Eelation is between related terms, and the word BETWEEN 
implies that the related terms as such are discrete. If and 
so far as there is continuous connection there is nothing 
between, and there is therefore no relation. 
A straight line may serve as an example of a continuum. 
The line has two halves which stand in the relation of right 
and left, the one being left and the other right. The two 
halves, besides being related, have also a continuous connection 
with each other. But the continuous connection is not itself 
a relation. For it exists only at the immediate junction of the 
two halves. In fact it simply is this immediate junction. 
Now, if this immediate junction is a relation, there must be 
related terms between which it holds. But what are these ? 
Any two portions of the line situated to right and left of the 
point of junction are each of them divisible into smaller 
portions. Let us suppose that the bit on the right is sub-
divided into a and b, and that on the left into a and /3, and 
let us suppose that a and a are nearest the meeting point. 
Evidently b and /3 are not immediately but mediately con-
joined. But a and b are themselves divisible into parts, and 
these again may be subdivided, and so on interminably. You 
never can assign two portions of the line whose relation is 
merely that of being immediately coadjacent in the same sense 
as their relation is that of right and left. Only least possible, 
and therefore indivisible, portions could be so. But there are 
no least possible portions. Points, it is true, are without 
magnitude. But then points are not component portions of 
the line. A point is an immediate meeting, and for that 
reason points themselves cannot meet. 
Within the continuous line it is possible to distinguish 
component parts and points of junction, and relations of these 
component parts and points of junction, and again, relatior.s 
of these relations. And this process is interminable. The 
discernible relations are numberless. They do not form a 
sum total. But the line itself is a terminated whole. If, 
A 2 
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4 G. F. STOUT. 
therefore, it is to be reduced to terms and relations, it must 
be their sum total, and not an endless series. But since the 
terms and relations do not form a sum total, and do form 
an endless series, they cannot of themselves constitute the 
units of the continuous line. 
Pure number expresses the essential nature of relation and 
relatedness, as distinguished from continuity. I t is the abstract 
form of relational connection. When we consider things merely 
as distinct and related, without reference to their special nature 
or the special nature of their relations, we can do nothing with 
them but count them. Eut things so far as they are countable 
are discrete. You cannot assign the number of portions into 
which a continuous line can be ultimately subdivided. You 
cannot do so because there is no end number, and there are no 
such countable parts. Hence the possibility of incommensurable 
magnitudes. The ratio, for instance, of the diagonal of a square 
to one of its sides is not capable of numerical expression. 
2. Nature of Disagreement icith Mr. Bradley.—In denying 
the self-sufficiency of any merely relational complex, I am at 
one with Mr. Bradley. But I cannot accept the line of argu-
ment by which he supports this thesis, and I feel compelled 
to reject another proposition which he combines with it and 
scarcely distinguishes from it. 
(a) His argument consists in an attempt to show that the 
concept of relation contains internal discrepancies—that it is 
" infected and contradicts itself." Now, I admit and maintain 
that inconsistency is inevitable if a relational complex as such 
is taken to be purely self-subsistent and self-explaining. In 
other words, the category of relation being inadequate to 
express the nature of the universe, incoherence arises as if we 
assume it to be adequate. But Mr. Bradley appears to hold 
that incoherence follows not merely from this assumption, but 
without reference to it from the intrinsic nature of the concept 
itself. With him the demonstration of internal discrepancy is 
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SELF-CONTRADICTIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF RELATION. 5 
a step logically prior, and independent; inadequacy is a subse-
quent inference. His general position is clearly expressed in 
a reply to Professor Watson's criticism. " I deny," he says, 
" that time or anything else could possibly be inadequate if it 
were not self-contradictory." As against this very plain state-
ment of Mr. Bradley's position I would suggest that inadequacy 
is sufficiently demonstrated if we can show that the assumption 
of adequacy leads to inconsistency. I t is not necessary to 
demonstrate self-contradiction independently of this assumption. 
But this is precisely what Mr. Bradley attempts to do, and 
what, in my opinion, he fails to do. According to him there is 
a vicious circle in the concept of relational complexity strictly 
analogous to that of a proposal to make one's way financially 
by always paying in ready money and living on the discount. 
Or, to vary the illustration, terms and their relations are 
supposed to maintain themselves, like the Stilly islanders, by 
taking in each others washing. I do not think that Mr. Bradley 
has succeeded in demonstrating such internal incoherence. 
(&) In the second place, Mr. Bradley is not content with 
denying the self-subsistent character of relational complexity. 
He also maintains that in affirming relations we affirm what 
is false. " The conclusion to which I am brought is that 
a relational way of thinking—any one that moves by the 
machinery of terms and relations—must give appearance and 
not truth." " No idea can be inadequate if it is not more 
or less false." Thus whenever we say that any two things, 
A and B, are related, according to Mr. Bradley we say what is 
false. I suppose, therefore, the contradictory proposition must 
always be true. Hence it must always be true that any two 
things, A and B, are not related, and never true that they are 
related. I t will be urged that this is a crude and unfair way 
of putting the case. For Mr. Bradley, it will be said, refers to 
ultimate truth, whereas I speak as if he held the relational 
way of thinking to be false in the ordinary every-day sense of 
the term. Now I admit that my statement of the case may 
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b' G. F. STOUT. 
very well be crude and unfair. Nevertheless, I have made it 
because it enables me to formulate a difficulty which I seriously 
feel. If the conception of relation is not false in the ordinary 
sense, in what precise sense is it false ? The falsity is not 
mere inadequacy. I t is something which calls for correction, 
not merely for a completion which its own nature demands: 
But what requires correction must, it would seem, be false in 
the ordinary every-day sense. 
My difficulty is greatly aggravated when I consider the 
nature of the argument by which Mr. Bradley attempts to 
demonstrate falsity. If the concept of relation were really 
infected with the self-contradictions, which he alleges, it would 
be false in no recondite sense, but in the ordinary every-day 
sense. Whoever used this concept in any judgment except 
that which affirms its falsity would not merely fail to express 
metaphysical truth; he would be telling a downright lie. A 
man may fight well enough after being wounded, but not after 
a bullet has passed through his heart. If, for example, space 
and time were self-contradictory in their very essence, it seems 
to me that space and time could not exist at all. There would 
be no space and no time. I t is this difficulty which has led 
me to search for some way of escape from the pressure of 
Mr. Bradley's dialectic. And the only way of escape is by 
showing that the alleged self-contradictions do not exist. 
3. Mr. Bradley sums up the result of his dialectic as 
follows:—" Belation presupposes quality, and quality relation. 
Each can be something, neither with nor apart from the other; 
and the vicious circle in which they turn is not the truth about 
reality." 
Before proceeding to examine these propositions it is 
necessary to point out a general defect in Mr. Bradley's 
analysis of relational complexity. He apparently recognises 
in such a complex only a relation on the one hand and on 
the other its terms "considered as having each a certain quality 
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SELF-CONTRADICTIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF DELATION. 7 
distinct from their relation. Now, besides the relation and 
the quality of the terms, we must, to be perfectly accurate, 
recognise as a third item essential to the relational unity the 
relatedness of the terms—the fact that they stand in this 
relation or that this relation holds between them. My hat, 
my head, and the relation of on and under taken collectively 
do not suffice to constitute the fact of my hat being on my 
head. All these may exist, at a given moment, and yet my hat 
might be on the peg and my head bare. We must add that 
my hat and my head are in this relation of " on and under," 
and we must specify in what manner each enters into it. This 
may appear a trifling subtlety. But it is certainly not so in 
view of the present question. This becomes evident if we 
turn to Mr. Bradley's note, p. 32 of Appearance and Reality. 
There he says :—" The relation is not an adjective of one term, 
for if so it does not relate. Nor for the same reason is it an 
adjective of each term taken apart, for then again there is no 
relation between them." This holds good of relations: but 
it does not hold good of relatedness. The relation of "on 
and under" cannot be a predicate either of my hat or my 
head or of both together. But it may be truly said of both 
of them that they are related. Further, this general predicate 
has a specific difference for each of them. My hat is on my 
head, but my head is under my hat. 
We may now consider the statement that relation and 
quality are nothing apart from each other. This statement 
I, of course, accept. But it is necessary to add comment 
and reservation. " Qualities are nothing without relations." 
This seems to me undeniable, and Mr. Bradley shows it to be 
undeniable. But why is it undeniable and what constitutes 
the force of Mr. Bradley's argument ? I submit that the 
nervus probandi does not lie in the bare fact abstractly con-
sidered that qualities are qualities. It lies rather in the fact 
that the qualities are partial features within a whole—within 
the unity of the universe. As such each partial feature must 
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8 G. F. STOUT. 
be connected with other partial features entering into the con-
stitution of the whole. Ignore the unity of the universe as 
including all difference and distinction and there is no argument 
left. Since, however, all distinction is distinction within the 
universe, whatever we distinguish must be connected. 
But Mr. Bradley seems to me to make an unjustifiable 
assumption at this point. He tacitly takes it for granted that 
the connection must be purely and exclusively relational in its 
character. Evidently I cannot admit this. I have argued that 
besides relation there is continuous connection, and that all 
relations ultimately presuppose a continuity. I must there-
fore add a reservation to the statement that all distinguishable 
features of the universe are interrelated. I would rather say 
that all distinguishable features of the universe are interrelated, 
if and so far as they are not continuous. 
On the inverse proposition that relations cannot have being 
without related terms, it is unnecessary to dwell. l a m heartily 
at one with Mr. Bradley when he summarily dismisses the view 
that the whole nature of the terms can somehow be resolved 
into their relatedness or their relations. As he says, " nothings 
cannot be related," and the supposition that relations somehow 
make the terms on which they stand is " quite unintelligible." 
4. We have now to examine the alleged " self-contradiction," 
which, according to Mr. Bradley, infects a relational way of 
thought. The contention is that relations and their terms, 
presuppose each other so as to involve a vicious circle which 
leads to an endless regress. At this point I feel somewhat 
doubtful as to the exact nature of the argument. Is the 
mutual presupposition of itself assumed to constitute a vicious 
circle, or is the circle vicious only because it leads in a special 
way to an endless regress ? In a sense there is an endless 
regress wherever there is a vicious circle. Two penniless 
persons propose to raise money by borrowing from each other. 
I n order that Brown may borrow from Jones, Jones must. 
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SELF-CONTKADICTIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF RELATION. 9 
possess money. But Jones can only possess it by first 
borrowing from Brown, who again can only possess it by 
first borrowing from Jones, and so on interminably. Here 
there is an endless regress with the peculiarity that none of 
the backward steps can find a foothold. This sort of regress, 
which would be interminable if it could take place at all, 
constitutes the essential nature of every vicious circle. But 
I am not sure that this is all Mr. Bradley means, or, at any 
rate, all that others may take him to mean, when he attempts 
to demonstrate an endless regress in the concept of relation. 
I t seems possible to regard his argument for an endless regress 
as independent. 
I t will be safer, therefore, to begin by considering whether 
the mutual dependence of the constituents of a relational com-
plex is in itself vicious. Now, it is certainly not true that 
all mutual dependence is to be condemned as illogical. Two 
penniless persons cannot raise money by borrowing from each 
other. But if Jone3 has five pounds, the penniless Brown 
may borrow. And yet there is a kind of circle in this case 
also. The borrowing on the part of Brown presupposes the 
independent existence of five pounds as the property of Jones, 
and on the other hand the five pounds owes its character of 
being a loan to the independent existence of Brown as a 
borrower. But there is here no logical vice. For the mutual 
dependence is in different respects. The borrowing presupposes 
the independent existence of the five pounds as money belonging 
to Jones. But this existence of the five pounds does not pre-
suppose the borrowing. Again, considered as being a loan, the 
five pounds does presuppose the borrowing. But the borrowing 
does not presuppose that money is already independently lent. 
On the contrary if it were so, Brown could not borrow it. 
Mutual dependence yields a vicious circle only when it is of a 
certain kind. I t does so only when the self-same feature A, 
which presupposes the independent being of B, is itself neces-
sary to constitute the independent being of B. 
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10 G. F. STOUT. 
Is this logical vice to be found in the structure of a 
relational complex, as such ? We have to consider three 
distinct couples: (1) Qualities and relatedness; (2) Qualities 
and relations ; (3) Eelations and relatedness. 
(1) Qualities cannot be unrelated, and the relatedness pre-
supposes quality. There is here mutual dependence, but not, I 
think, in precisely the same respects. We have seen why 
qualities cannot be unrelated. I t is because they are partial 
features within the unity of the universe. On the other hand 
relatedness presupposes quality merely as such. It does not 
presuppose as an independent fact that qualities are already 
partial features within a whole before they begin to be related. 
I t no more presupposes this than the act of borrowing five 
pounds presupposes that the money is already independently 
lent before it is borrowed. 
(2) Qualities depend on relations and relations on qualities. 
But the qualities depend on the relations only for their related-
ness, and not for their quality as such in distinction from their 
relatedness. Only in respect of their relatedness do they pre-
suppose the independent being of the relations, just as it is 
only in respect of being a loan that five pounds presupposes a 
borrowing. On the other hand the relations presuppose the 
independent being of the qualities as such. The independent 
being of their relatedness is not presupposed. I t is unnecessary 
to assume that in order to constitute the relation the terms 
must already be independently related. 
(3) Eelation and relatedness are interdependent. The 
relation presupposes the relatedness as an adjective of the 
qualities. I t is the relatedness as adjective which constitutes 
the qualities terms in the relation. On the other hand 
relatedness presupposes relation, not because it is adjective 
of the terms, but because it is an adjective of a special 
kind. The terms might have other predicates, but they 
could not stand in relation without a relation for them to 
stand in. 
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SELF-CONTRADICTIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF RELATION. 1 1 
On the whole, then, a direct analysis of the constitution of a 
relational complex fails to show that the mutual dependence of 
its constituents involves a vicious circle. 
5. Coming now to the alleged endless regress, I should like 
to say that, even if it were demonstrated, I should not regard 
it as necessarily implying the falsity or absurdity of the 
concept of relation, but only its inadequacy in the special 
sense I am attaching to that word. Only one kind of endless 
regress implies falsity and absurdity—the kind which is due to 
a vicious circle. The mark of this is that you are constantly 
forced to step backward and yet can never find a footing, as 
in the example of two penniless persons raising money by 
borrowing of each other. But there is another kind of endless 
regress in which you are constantly forced to step backwards 
but never fail to find a foothold. The infinite divisibility of 
space is an example of this regress which involves no self-
contradiction. However, I do not find it necessary to press 
this point at present. For I do not see that the concept of 
relation does, in fact, involve the interminable series which 
Mr. Bradley pretends to discover in it. His argument is stated 
in the chapter on " Substance and Adjective," and again 
repeated in the chapter of "Belation and Quality." But in 
this last chapter there is a complication which I shall deal 
with separately. In its simple form the whole point of the 
argument is contained in the reiterated question—What con-
nects the relation and its terms ? And what gives edge to the 
question is that the relation as such is not an adjective or 
predicate of the terms. I reply, in the first place, that what 
connects the terms with the relation is the relatedness. This 
is a common adjective both of the relation and the terms. 
We express the self-same fact when we say that a relation 
is of or between qualities, and when we say that the qualities 
are in the relation. But here, again, the importunate question 
emerges—What is the mediating link which joins the term to 
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12 G. F. STOUT. 
its relatedness ? Are we not driven to posit other relations 
and other relatedness ad infinitum ? I answer that there is no 
intermediate link, and that there is need for none. For the 
connection is continuous, and has its ground in that ultimate 
continuity which is presupposed by all relational unity. I 
would add that Mr. Bradley scarcely seems to be justified by 
his own principles in pressing the demand for an intermediate 
link at this point. For he admits that necessary connection 
as distinguished from brute conjunction satisfies the demands 
of thought. But he has himself shown that it is a necessity of 
thought that qualities should be related. It may be more or 
less of a brute conjunction that a certain quality enters into a 
certain relation. 
But that is a different and irrelevant matter; at least, 
I think it irrelevant. But Mr. Bradley would certainly not 
admit this. The question of its relevancy is really of vital 
importance. But I must postpone treatment of it to another 
occasion, when I hope to deal with the theory of Predication. 
We have not yet done with the endless regress. We have 
yet to examine a special form in which Mr. Bradley states his 
argument in this chapter. It consists in an attempt to show 
that the relation between terms must itself enter into the 
quality of the terms as distinguished from their relatedness. 
There must thus be a diversity in the quality as such which is 
inconsistent with its nature. " Without the use of a relation 
it is impossible to predicate this variety of A. And on the 
other hand, with an internal relation A's unity disappears, and 
its contents are dissipated in an endless process of distinction." 
" Every quality in relation has in consequence a diversity 
within its own nature, and this diversity cannot be immediately 
asserted of the quality. Hence the quality must exchange its 
unity for an internal relation. But thus set free, the diverse 
aspects, because each something in relation, must each be some-
thing also beyond. This diversity is fatal to the internal unity 
of each; and it demands a new relation, and so on without limit." 
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SELF-CONTKADICTIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF RELATION. 1 3 
This argument bewilders me, and I am not at all sure that 
I understand it. But when I make the attempt the following 
is what happens to me. First of all I am called on to recognise 
that the whole nature of a related term cannot consist in its 
relatedness. Besides this, the term must have a quality. So 
far there is no difficulty. My attention is now selectively 
fixed on the quality as such in distinction from its relatedness. 
The relatedness is treated by me as irrelevant, just because 
I have been invited to take into account only the quality as 
distinguished from its relatedness. Next I am called on to 
recognise that the quality after all is and must be related. 
And I am called on to recognise this while at the same 
time I am to persist in disregarding relatedness, and in 
considering the quality barely as such. It being assumed that 
I have accomplished this impossible feat, it is pointed out 
that I am now affirming relatedness of the bare quality as 
such, and therefore the relation must enter into the constitution 
of this quality abstractly considered. Hence there arises in 
it an inner diversity which leads to an endless regress. The 
whole of this argument seems to be vitiated by a confusion 
between ignoring aud denying—between abstraction and 
hypostatising the abstract object. In considering the quality 
of a term apart from its relatedness, I do not for a moment 
consider it really to exist apart from its relatedness. I do not 
for a moment deny the relatedness. I may deliberately treat 
it as irrelevant, but in the very act of treating it as irrelevant 
I recognise its existence. Whenever the question is raised I 
undo my abstraction and reaffirm what I never meant to deny. 
It seems to me that by reasoning similar to Mr. Bradley's 
I could prove that my own head contains the rest of my body. 
For certainly my head can be considered apart from the rest 
of my body without considering it to be apart from the rest of 
the body. I can consider it apart while remaining aware that 
it cannot exist apart. I can regard this connection as irrelevant, 
and yet find much to say concerning my head—much that would 
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14 6 . F. STOUT. 
not be true of it, if in fact it were not connected with my body. 
Now my head, thus considered apart, is none-the less in fact 
joined to a trunk and limbs. But since it is considered apart, 
the trunk and limbs to which it originally belonged are 
logically severed from it. Hence it is a logical necessity to 
supply it with a new trunk and limbs, and if we are to avoid 
a repetition of the previous argument, these must fall inside 
the head itself. But this, again, is of no avail; for the head 
as such cannot combine this internal diversity. It is still 
capable of being considered apart from the body which is 
supposed to be inside it, and so there is an internal principle 
of fissure which conducts to no end. 
Perhaps this is a mere parody of Mr. Bradley's meaning. 
But, on the other hand, it may not be so. For the intricacy of 
dialectical reasoning are sufficient to cause even a consummate 
master in this line to trip now and then. In any case, if I 
have misunderstood, I am anxious to know where and how. 
And I hope that what I have said, both on this last point and 
on others, may give me a chance of enlightenment from those 
who understand better. 
DISCUSSION ON DR. STOUT'S PAPER. 
Mr. H. WILDON CARR said:— 
There are two main contentions in this paper each of which 
seems to me to involve a contradiction. 
(1) The first of these contentions is that continuous connec-
tion is not a relation. Kelations, Dr. Stout says, hold between 
the partial features or aspects of a whole. I conclude, there-
fore, that between two wholes there are no relations. A 
continuum is the form of unity of a whole. The parts of a 
whole are not discrete because there is continuous connection 
between them, and continuous connection is the negation of 
discreteness. Continuous connection is not a relation, it is 
 by guest on June 6, 2016
http://aristotelian.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
SELF-CONTRADICTIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF RELATION. 1 5 
the denial of a "between, and where there is no between there 
can be no relation. I conclude, therefore, that between the 
parts of a whole there are no relations. But pure number 
expresses, Dr. Stout goes on to say, the essential nature of 
relation and relatedness as distinguished from continuity. 
Consequently wholes are related, if they can be numbered, 
and so are parts. I am in doubt, however, whether Dr. Stout 
holds that there can be wholes within a whole, or that there is 
but one whole, the all-inclusive universe ? If the former (and 
unless this is the view I fail to see the significance of the 
illustration of the straight line), is the continuum the form 
of the unity of the whole and the relation the unity of the 
wholes in the universe ? But if the latter, then in what way 
does the view differ from Mr. Bradley's ? And is the continuum 
only a form of unity, or is it the only form of unity ? Further, 
Dr. Stout speaks of continuous connection as something, but 
defines it as nothing. I t is not a relation. I t is not a self-
subsistent reality, for it is form without content. I t is not 
a quality, for it is indifferent to content. I t is the immediate 
junction of parts within a whole, it exists only at the point of 
junction, and it is not something existing, but nothing existing 
at this point of junction. I t is the fact that nothing exists at 
the point of junction of the parts. This is illustrated by a 
straight line: the two halves have a continuous connection, but 
this is not a relation; it does not qualify the two halves; the 
connection is not of the two halves, but of those parts of the 
halves which are contiguous. Divide the halves, and the 
distant quarters have only a mediate continuity. Apparently, 
then, the straight line is not continuous, but the possible 
infinite divisions of it are continuous at each point of junction. 
(2) The second main contention of the paper is that besides 
Eelation and Quality there is a third item, viz., Eelatedness. 
The thesis seems to me to be this:—A Eelation depends on 
and presupposes a Quality with Relatedness as its adjective; a 
Quality depends on a Eelation only for its Eelatedness, not-
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16 G. F. STOUT. 
for its Content. If this be the meaning, then Eelatedness is 
an adjective—it exists not in itself, but for another. Though 
the adjective of a quality, the quality is indifferent to it. The 
quality is what it is independently of the Eelatedness. There-
fore Eelatedness is an adjective which does not qualify. 
(3) Dr. Stout's difficulty in 2 (b) seems to me a simple 
misunderstanding. What is " more or less false" is more or 
less true, and not as he puts it, " false." 
(4) With regard to the final illustration of the relation of 
the head to the trunk and the limbs, would Dr. Stout's doctrine 
require us to hold that there can be no relation between them 
because there is continuous connection ? Or that the continuous 
connection is no part of the relation between them ? And, 
further, that there is a Eelatedness, an adjective both of the 
head and the trunk, and of the relations between them ? 
Mr. SHADWOKTH H. HODGSON read the following remarks:— 
Mr. Bradley's fireworks seem to have completely dazzled 
our President, though happily by no means blinded him. We 
find him, in fact, expressing doubts as to whether he has really 
understood Mr. Bradley's meaning. I happen to be in agree-
ment with our President in the essentials of his argument, 
which, as I understand it, is directed to show the logical 
validity of using terms like relation and quality in examining 
experience, whereas Mr. Bradley's argument rests on isolating 
and practically hypostatising these terms, and then showing 
that so to hypostatise them is to make them self-contradictory, 
and therefore incapable of standing, either alone or in combina-
tion with each other, as members of a world of Eeality, which 
is defined as a world in which there is no contradiction. 
Nevertheless, I think that our President takes Mr. Bradley 
much too seriously, and as to his attack on him by attacking 
one section of his argument, you might as well try to extinguish 
a sky-rocket by water from the hose of a fire-engine. I should 
have admired Mr. Bradley's so-called dialectic more if he had 
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SELF-CONTRADICTIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF RELATION. 1 7 
taken warning by Zeno's example, and had not virtually repeated 
his fallacies, adding similar ones of his own. 
But let me not be misunderstood. There are many things in 
this and other important works of Mr. Bradley which are most 
admirable and valuable, as, for instance, iii his general con-
clusion, in his last chapter, about the impossibility of trans-
cending experience. But these results are only reached by 
dropping out of view his earlier destructive criticisms, as, for 
instance, when he speaks, in his conclusion, of the possibly 
" unlimited transformation" of the predicates which " qualify 
Reality" (p. 541, 2nd edition), forgetting apparently that 
in an earlier chapter he had demonstrated all Change to be 
impossible (pp. 46, 47, 2nd edition). 
I should never have dreamt of attacking Mr. Bradley's 
destructive criticisms in the way which our President has 
adopted. When I find a method built up on the basis of an 
unthinkable paradox, I at once dismiss it as hopeless. Now 
Mr. Bradley cuts the ground from below his own feet when he 
says that all change is impossible. And why so ? Because 
thought itself is a process, which includes change. So that 
thought itself becomes an impossibility on Mr. Bradley's 
method. 
Moreover, thought proceeds by establishing relations, either 
permanent or provisional, and can proceed no otherwise. I t 
proceeds on the basis of the so-called Postulates, Identity, 
Contradiction, and Excluded Middle. These, as well as the 
judgments founded on them, are alike Eelations. I ask, there-
fore, whether we are to take Contradiction as a thought, or 
thought itself as a Contradiction ? Mr. Bradley, it would 
seem, must perforce hold the latter. 
I am sure we ought to be grateful to our President for 
bringing the question of Mr. Bradley's work squarely before 
the Society. No one can mistake the stimulating nature of its 
so-called Dialectic. And perhaps to Mr. Bradley also we 
ought to be grateful for coming to the conclusions he comes 
B 
 by guest on June 6, 2016
http://aristotelian.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
18 G. F. STOUT. 
to, even though fallaciously, I mean those concerning 
Experience and the Universe, by means of a dialectical as 
distinguished from an analytical method; since he thereby 
breaks with the idea, that thought can frame a conception, 
at once positive and adequate, of the Universe. 
I confess that for my part I prefer the analytical method. 
I prefer to go to experience directly, submitting it to analysis, 
rather than enquire in the first place what our thoughts 
about experience seem to be but are not. In my opinion the 
analytical method supplies the only safeguard against the 
fallacies which beset the dialectical, and which are so profusely 
exemplified in the twelve earlier chapters of Mr. Bradley's 
book. 
This safeguard consists chiefly in two great and pervading 
facts, discoverable in all experience; first, the presence, in 
every experience, of elements which are distinguishable but 
incapable of separate existence, and second, the fact that 
experiences, or their elements, must be grouped at least 
under the two great heads of perception and of thought, 
together with the fact of the close interconnection of the two 
groups. Most logical puzzles will, I think, be found capable 
of solution by carefully attending to these two great facts. 
The following communication from Mr. HENRY STURT was 
read:— 
I agree with the drift of Dr. Stout's arguments, but not 
with the way he puts them. I t seems to me that no clear 
result can be reached by discussing how qualities stand to 
relations. Qualities are only aspects of things. The question 
is rather how things (including events) stand to relations. 
Dr. Stout really seems to admit this by his stress on relatedness. 
Eelatedness seems equivalent to thinghood or "eventhood." 
All Dr. Stout's concrete examples are things or events. If the 
question be stated thus it is plainly impossible that things 
should exist without relations or relations without things. For 
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SELF-CONTRADICTIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF RELATION. 19 
taking reality as an ideal construction, as it primarily is, things 
correspond to the foci of our attention and relations to the 
transitions of i t ; and focussing and transition are essential 
elements of any kind of experience that we know. In regard 
to Mr. Bradley's paradoxical argument that relations with 
things (we call them qualities) are unintelligible, I think 
Dr. Stout indicates the right kind of answer in saying that 
continuous connection is prior to discrete relation. But I think 
it would have been better to have argued here again from the 
standpoint of human experience and to have pointed out that, 
normally, the mind moves continuously from focus to focus. 
Where changes are discrete we cannot understand them except 
by supposing that they would be found continuous if our 
attention were brought to bear on them. If continuous relation, 
then, be a primary fact of human experience it is idle to call it 
irrational (as Mr. Bradley does); because there is no more 
ultimate criterion to measure its rationality by. As to the 
nature of the all-inclusive universe, I do not think we know 
enough about it to condemn or justify thing and relations as 
we know them. Both Mr. Bradley and Dr. Stout seem to 
anticipate experience beyond their warrant. I agree with 
Dr. Stout that the all-inclusive consciousness cannot be 
imagined to have the discrete or " gap-rational " form. But I 
do not see why it should be smoothly continuous, like a straight 
line. Why can it not be continuously relational consciousness 
like the human ? 
The following communication from Dr. JAMES LINDSAY was 
read:— 
It is certainly an interesting question whether self-contra-
dictions inhere in Belation—that "mother of all the categories." 
Kelations exist, I hold, only as our relating activity constitutes 
them. They are just the forms which our thought impresses 
on all objects of thought. The real is the related. When 
Bradley says " a relational way of thinking" must give 
•B2 
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20 G. F. STOUT. 
" appearance and not truth"—to affirm relations being, with 
him, to affirm what is false—he is the victim of confusion of 
thought. To relate is to think: all objects of my knowledge 
become, under the functioning of my intellect, related to me ; 
to say that, because the relations so affirmed are relative to me, 
they give " appearance and not truth," is either absurd, or is 
an idle play upon words. For, of course, as I am not the 
Absolute Self, the truth they have brought ine cannot be the 
truth of such Absolute; but it is utterly unwarrantable to say 
I have only "appearance and not truth." The self-contra-
dictoriness is Mr. Bradley's own, for he does not seem to under-
stand how such relativity comports with truth or reality. He 
does not apprehend how deeply grounded Eelation is in the 
very nature of truth or reality, and it is the lack of this 
perception which seems to me to vitiate his pronouncements 
here. He says " relations are nothing intelligible, either with 
or without their qualities." This is surely absurd—a thing 
which, in his own phrase, " loudly contradicts itself," for surely 
in my knowledge of these relations I know that things are, 
which is something " intelligible," while, when account is taken 
of their qualities, I know what these things are. 
Bradley himself says, at p. 390, " truth and reality are 
matter of degree," and again, at p. 487, he says " the doctrine 
of degrees in reality and truth is the fundamental answer to 
our problem." Precisely ; that is my contention; but then, 
what becomes of Bradley's contention that the truth of partial 
degree is " appearance and not truth," and of his denial to it of 
worth indefeasible and absolute ? His scepticism has shorn him 
of the " will to believe " : his desire to grapple with relations 
and qualities in their ontological aspects and difficulties seems 
to me to have obscured for him the " degree" of truth in the 
epistemological and subjective aspects. Of course " an open 
and staring discrepancy "—as he terms it—could be the only 
result of an impossible striving after absoluteness of the all-
inclusive sort here. His sweeping condemnations of finite 
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expsrience and its supposed contradictions are the inevitable 
consequence of his servitude to an abstract logic of identity— 
with what he calls (p. 34) " inconsistencies " " forced together " 
—in short, an absurd and impossible criterion. And, when he 
talks of " the vicious circle " in whicli relations and qualities 
move, he does not seem to me to understand either qualities or 
relations, as these pertain to our subjectivity, in its uuity and 
activity. He treats them as entities, which they are not; and 
he talks of them as if they were separate and disjointed facts, 
which again they are not. It does not seem to have occurred 
to him that they are really two sides or aspects of one and the 
same fundamental process of our subjective experience. "What, 
therefore, from one point of view may be relation, may, from 
another view point, appear as quality. The feud which Bradley 
has stirred between the abstract notion of relation and the no 
less abstract conception of " quality is indeed unintelligible," to 
use Bradley's own term, since it is the illegitimate result of 
treating the abstract form of relation as if it were an entity. 
"What has really been " infected" is Bradley's own treat-
ment through this vitiating element, which has not only 
rendered it absurd, but false to actual truth, or, in Bradley's 
curious phrase, " true reality." 
Dr. G. F. STOUT'S reply to the foregoing criticisms:— 
There is much in the criticisms of my paper which I find 
helpful. I must explain that the paper itself is by no means 
meant to be a final treatment of the topics which it discusses. 
I t was intended above all to elicit criticism which should guide 
in a more thorough and systematic examination of the whole 
series of questions raised by Mr. Bradley's Metaphysic, and 
by that logical theory of predication on which it is based. I 
hope to be able to deal with the theory of predication next 
session. 
I must postpone till then any reply to Mr. Carr's remarks 
about Eelatedness. "Without considering the whole doctrine 
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22 G. F. STOUT. 
of predication, I cannot answer his question as to the sense in 
which Relatedness may or may not be an adjective of the 
related quality. 
Mr. Carr's first objection or series of objections seems to be 
based on misunderstanding. When I deny that continuous 
connection is a relation, I mean to use the term relation in 
the sense which Mr. Bradley appears to attach to it. For 
Mr. Bradley a relation is an intermediate link. I t is inter-
mediate in such a way that we can intelligibly inquire what it 
is that comes between the relation and each of the terms related 
so as to join them. I merely wished to point out that this 
question loses all point to the case of continuous connection as 
end. For continuous connection is immediate. I t is not an 
intervening link. 
By whole I mean " unified differences " wherever and how-
ever they are found. A relational complex in my restricted 
sense of the term relation is for me a whole. But it is a 
whole which necessarily presupposes a continuum within which 
both the differences and their (discrete) relations fall. And 
when I say this I by no means mean that they are necessarily 
merged in its continuity. There may be both relations and 
continuous connection. But the continuous connection is 
necessary to make the discrete relations intelligible. I t also 
seems to me that the inverse liolds good. There is mutual 
dependence, but in different respects. Perhaps my illustration 
by means of a straight line was unfortunate. For such abstract 
spatial continuity is a poverty-stricken example of a continuum. 
Also it suggests that continuity involves infinite divisibility, and 
this I should deny. I should even deny that any particular 
sensible (as opposed to geometrical) bit of extension is infinitely 
divisible, although it is continuous. 
For me a continuous connection is somewhat actually 
existing. "When Mr. Carr says that nothing exists at the 
point of junction at two parts of a line, he ought to have 
added, " except the point of junction itself." And the point 
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SELF-CONTRADIOTIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF RELATION. 2 3 
just is the junction. This is clearer when you consider a line 
as the immediate meeting of two surfaces. The line is certainly 
somewhat,—somewhat with parts, and with a definite length 
and shape. But it is nothing between the two surfaces. I t is 
only their immediate junction, although it is a junction having 
a distinctive character. 
Mr. Carr hardly appreciates my difficulty as to contradiction 
and falsity. My point is that whatever is internally contra-
dictory must be pro tanto incapable of actual existence. Now, 
according to Bradley, space, time, &c, are infected in their 
essence by internal contradiction. The very meaning of the 
words space and time involves such incoherence. I t follows 
that space and time can have no existence. If I say that 
someone lives on the discount which he gets by paying in 
ready money I affirm something as fact, which cannot be fact. 
Doubtless my statement contains more or less truth. For 
discount has actual existence, and ready money has actual 
existence, and so forth. But the living on the ready money 
can have no existence, and the absolute itself is totally 
incapable of making it an actual or a possible fact. Now 
space and time are actual facts. 
Mr. Hodgson does not appear to say anything in the way of 
hostile criticism. I find myself in almost entire agreement 
with his remarks. As a matter of personal bias I sympathise 
with his preference of the analytic to the dialectic method, 
although I think I should use the term analytic in a wider 
sense than he ordinarily does. But the dialectic method seems 
to me to be legitimate and even necessary in its place. The 
analytic must show its efficiency by resolving dialectical 
difficulties. For the rest I agree with him as to the direction 
in which a " safeguard " from dialectical fallacies is to be found. 
Mr. Start thinks that we should consider relation as only 
existing between " things," and not between qualities. I fail to 
understand. A thing has many qualities, and these qualities 
are interrelated. Indeed a thing essentially involves a scheme 
 by guest on June 6, 2016
http://aristotelian.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
24 G. F. STOUT. 
of relations. As Hume remarks, the chief ingredient in our 
complex idea of a substance is the " principle of combination." 
To say that " qualities are only aspects of things " conveys no 
light to my mind. If we use aspects in Mr. Hodgson's sense as 
meaning differences which are distinguishable but essentially 
inseparable, I do not see how the statement can be true. Locke 
long ago pointed out that the union of qualities in a material 
thing is conspicuously characterised by the absence of necessary 
connection. How can you say that the yellowness of gold, and 
its specific gravity, and its hardness, and its solubility in aqua 
regia are abstract aspects of one indivisible fact ? This term 
" aspect" is often used in a very loose and bewildering way. I 
believe that Mr. Sturt must mean differences due to the variable 
points of view from which we may regard something, but not 
inherent in the nature of this something apart from our attitude 
towards it. I doubt whether this is a possible conception. But 
even if it is allowed to be legitimate, how can it apply to the 
diversity of qualities which we attribute to a " thing " ? And 
yet I do not wish to imply that I am wholly out of sympathy 
with Mr. Sturt on this point. Only I do not think that he 
has succeeded in expressing his own meaning. 
Dr. Lindsay does not concern himself at all with my paper. 
"With his own criticism of Bradley I do not agree. I do not 
think that he at all understands the strength of the position 
which he assails. I would repeat in conclusion that I by no 
means regard my own paper as more than a tentative beginning, 
which can have value only if it is followed up. It is merely 
an " affair of outposts." 
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